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Civil Procedure:
Managing Class-Action Conflicts
Morris Ratner1
The advent of the twentieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s
landmark decision in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor2 provides the
opportunity to reflect on the largely unnoticed collapse of the framework
it announced for managing intra-class conflicts. The Amchem framework
was bold, in that it broadly defined actionable conflicts to include
divergent interests with regard to settlement allocation; market-based, in
that it sought to regulate such conflicts by using subclasses to harness
competing plaintiffs’ counsel’s financial incentives; and committed to
intrinsic process values, insofar as, to assure structural fairness, the court
was willing to upend settlements that would have eased the crush of
asbestos litigation.
Since the late 1990s, the lower federal courts have quietly flipped
that regime on its head, limiting Amchem and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,3
to their facts, narrowly defining the kinds of conflicts that warrant
subclassing, and turning to alternative assurances of fairness—such as
reliance on court-appointed settlement neutrals—that do not involve
fostering competition among subclass counsel. This article connects the
dots between Amchem and more recent, sprawling mass-tort settlement
class actions in the BP oil spill and NFL concussion-injury litigations by
providing a descriptive and institutional account of Amchem’s treatment
in the lower courts.
The Amchem Conflicts Management Regime
In Amchem and Ortiz, the Supreme Court overturned two of the
largest mass tort settlements in U.S. history on the ground that intra-class
conflicts of interest rendered representation inadequate. The trial court in
each case had approved a class-action settlement of asbestos claims even
though the members of the settlement class had divergent interests with
regard to settlement design and fund allocation. The Court held that such
conflicts could not be overcome merely by showing that a settlement was
fair. Instead, the representation of absent class members in the settlement
1. Summarized and adapted from Morris A. Ratner, Class Conflicts, 92 WASH. L.
REV. 785 (2017).
2. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
3. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
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process also had to be adequate. In Amchem and Ortiz, that meant that
the settlement classes had to be divided into subclasses, each with their
own representative plaintiffs and, importantly, their own lawyers, whose
fees depended on the subclass members’ recoveries and who could thus
be trusted to advance their interests when negotiating settlement terms.
Failure to do so rendered class certification illegitimate and justified
overturning the class settlements, leaving the federal trial courts saddled
with the asbestos-litigation crisis without any viable tools for resolving it
outside of bankruptcy proceedings.
This approach to conflicts arose out of the mass-tort procedural
infrastructure of the day. Due to then-prevailing jurisdictional doctrine,
including the limits of diversity jurisdiction, much nationwide-class
litigation occurred in state courts. Because class counsel’s role was
contingent upon a court certifying the class and rendering a class
judgment, and because other camps of plaintiffs’ counsel could easily
file in a competing jurisdiction, settle with the defendant, and scoop the
case, plaintiffs’ counsel experienced an intense and existential form of
role-insecurity. Their investment in class litigation could at any moment
be wiped out by an interloper, leading to what leading commentators saw
as the most glaring ethical lapse of the era: the reverse auction, when
defendants pitted competing camps of plaintiffs’ counsel against each
other, awarding the role of settlement class counsel to the lowest bidder.
Thus, at the time it decided Amchem and Ortiz, the Supreme Court
faced a landscape in which federal courts seemed poorly situated to
regulate the quality of multijurisdictional class actions, class counsel’s
self-seeking stood out as the central problem, and agency-cost theory
provided the conceptual framework for providing a conflictsmanagement solution.4 Building on that foundation, the Court was
naturally drawn to find some way to strengthen the adequacy-ofrepresentation inquiry using a market- or incentive-based frame, one that
looked to the manipulation of counsel’s incentives. The Court
accomplished its goal by stating what read like a clear approach to class
conflicts: deny class certification in the absence of subclassing with
separate counsel whose fees depended on outcomes achieved for the
subclass.

4. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications
of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law through Class and Derivative
Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 684-90 (1986).
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Upending Amchem: A Quiet Revolution
With few exceptions,5 the lower federal courts have quietly and
successfully revolted. Two recent mass-tort cases reveal just how far the
courts have moved away from the Amchem regime. In both cases, class
members’ divergent interests regarding the design and allocation of any
eventual settlement were apparent at the outset of the litigation.
Nevertheless, the trial and appellate courts found either an absence of
conflicts or that any conflicts were insufficiently fundamental to warrant
denial of certification.
In the BP oil-spill litigation, the same group of plaintiffs’ counsel
appointed at the outset of the litigation to serve as members of the
multidistrict-litigation (“MDL”) plaintiffs’ steering committee served as
settlement class counsel in a series of economic-loss, personal-injury,
and punitive-damages class-action settlements that were structured in a
way that invited tradeoffs among class members and, even, with regard
to the punitive-damages settlements, pitted class members against each
other.
For example, in the economic-loss settlement, BP assigned its claims
against non-settling defendants to the settlement class. To resolve those
and other claims, the MDL plaintiffs’ steering committee negotiated two
new class settlements, one with Halliburton, the provider of the cement
used at the original BP drill site, and another with Transocean, the
owners of the drilling rig. These settlements resolved two categories of
claims, those of the “Old Class” (the BP economic loss class described
above), to end litigation regarding BP’s Assigned Claims, as well as
those of a “New Class” of all persons with punitive-damages claims
against Halliburton and Transocean, only a subset of whom were
members of the Old Class. The New Class was both narrower and
broader than Old Class. It was broader because it included “many
claimants whose property suffered direct physical damage from the
explosion and oil spill, but who were excluded from the Old Class.
Among others, these include local governments . . . and oil and gas
interests.”6 It was narrower because it included only that subset of Old
Class members who could satisfy the “physical injury” threshold of the
5. The Second Circuit is the lone flag-bearer of a strict reading of Amchem and
Ortiz. See Payment Card Interchange Fee & Merchant Discount Antitrust Litig., 827 F.3d
223 (2d Cir. 2016); In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig. v. Thomson
Corp., 654 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2011).
6. Transocean’s Punitive Damages and Assigned Claims Settlement Agreement
(“Transocean Settlement Agreement”) at *19, In re BP Oil Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179
(E.D. La. May 29, 2015), ECF No. 14644-1.
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Robins Dry Dock rule7 and thus were entitled to a punitive-damages
award.8 The same lawyers served as “Old Class” and “New Class”
counsel. The agreements they negotiated with Halliburton and
Transocean expressly pitted Old and New Class members against each
other, in that the capped settlement amounts had to be allocated between
them. Nevertheless, the trial court certified the settlement classes and
granted final approval to the proposed settlements.9
Unlike the BP litigation settlements, which involved no subclassing
with separate counsel, the NFL concussion-injury litigation illustrates
minimalist and pro forma use of subclassing, without guaranteeing truly
separate and independent representation. From the outset of the case, it
was obvious that any settlement would have to distinguish among class
members based on a range of factors, including type of illness. The final
NFL settlement did so through its central feature, an uncapped Monetary
Award Fund overseen by a claims administrator that would provide
compensation for Retired Players who submit proof of Qualifying
Diagnosis. The settlement recognized only six Qualifying Diagnoses,
from varying levels of neurological impairment to Alzheimer’s Disease,
Parkinson’s Disease, ALS, and death with chronic traumatic
encephalopathy (CTE). The settlement also released claims without
compensation for many of the symptoms of CTE, such as changes in
mood, including depression.10
Though one can imagine subclassing on multiple dimensions, the
trial court certified only two subclasses, for claimants with and without a
Qualifying Diagnosis. The trial court appointed separate counsel for each
subclass to participate in the negotiations, but they were appointed only
after negotiations by all counsel had begun.11 Moreover, subclass counsel
were appointed from the group of common-benefit counsel who had
already been representing all plaintiffs in the MDL and were not only
counsel for the subclasses but were also common-benefit counsel for all
MDL plaintiffs as well as class counsel for all class members who also
happened to have special responsibility for advancing subclass members’
interests.12 They did not even have responsibility for negotiating a
settlement of subclass members’ claims or issues and instead just “played
7. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
8. Transocean Settlement Agreement at *18.
9. See Final Order and Judgment Granting Approval of HESI and Transocean
Punitive Damages and Assigned Claims Settlement Agreements at 2-4, In re BP Oil
Spill, No. 2:10-md-02179 (E.D. La. Feb. 15, 2017), ECF No. 22253.
10. See Turner v. NFL, 307 F.R.D. 351, 365, 367, 397 (E.D. Pa 2015).
11. In re NFL Players, 821 F.3d 410, 429 (3d Cir. 2016).
12. NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 429; Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 425.
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an active role” in the mediation process.13 In the NFL concussion-injury
litigation, subclass counsel’s fortunes did not clearly rise or fall with
those of the class members; instead, as class counsel for all class
members, their fees could arguably be determined based on the value of
the settlement to class members as a whole. Nevertheless, the Third
Circuit affirmed the class-certification and settlement-approval order
entered by the trial court.14
The trial and intermediate appellate courts in these recent mass tort
class settlements deployed a stock set of moves to avoid being more
rigorously faithful to the Amchem regime, including narrowly defining
the scope of “fundamental” conflicts,15 raising the specter of
“Balkanization” as a result of subclassing,16 relying on court-appointed
neutrals in lieu of structural fairness,17 and finding proof of procedural
fairness in the settlements’ substantive terms.18 In short, they flipped the
broad, market-based, Amchem regime rooted in a commitment to
intrinsic process values. In its stead, these and other courts have
articulated a new conflicts-management regime that is more tolerant of
conflicts, places more faith in the trial court’s ability to regulate
conflicts, and looks to outcomes as proof of adequate representation.
An Institutional Account
What explains the emergence of this new conflicts-management
regime? As noted, at the time Amchem and Ortiz were decided, federal
courts were jurisdictionally challenged with regard to mass-tort class
actions, and, relatedly, the reverse auction was the most glaring ethical
challenge of the day. Congress and courts responded with new formal
and informal institutional arrangements for managing mass-tort and other
geographically dispersed class actions that together constitute a new
13. See Declaration of Robert H. Klonoff Relating to the Proposed Class Settlement
in the National Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation ¶ 31, In re Nat’l
Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 2:12-md-02323-AB (E.D. La.
Nov. 12, 2014), ECF No.6423-9.
14. NFL Players, 821 F.3d at 447-48.
15. Economic Final Approval Order at 34 (finding no “fundamental” conflicts, and
that “[i]t’s perfectly fair and reasonable, and indeed common and accepted, for settlement
benefits to turn on strength of class members’ claims”); Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 376
(narrowly defining “fundamental” conflicts as existing “where some [class] members
claim to have been harmed by the same conduct that benefitted other members of the
class.”).
16. Economic Final Approval Order at 35-36.
17. Id. at 33; Turner, 307 F.R.D. at 377.
18. Economic Final Approval Order at 31.
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MDL model. This new model results from the interaction between the
Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) of 2005, which has largely
federalized multistate class actions, and the MDL statute,19 which
centralizes them before a single federal court trial judge. So empowered,
federal trial-court judges have innovated a range of case-management
techniques that give them substantial control over litigation, partly via
the appointment and supervision of plaintiffs’ steering committees whose
positions are secure and who thus do not feel pressure to engage in
reverse auctions. But without the possibility of class trials in these mass
torts, MDL judges have only one possible successful outcome:
settlement. Thus, while the new MDL model for managing litigation of
mass torts and other geographically dispersed harms was born of mistrust
of class counsel, it has had the effect of inspiring lower federal courts to
trust them all the more at the time of settlement. The Amchem framework
for regulating class conflicts now feels both less necessary and far less
convenient, insofar as it fosters competition among subclass counsel in a
system with only one endgame.

19. 28 U.S.C. § 1407.

